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Good Kings, Bloody Tyrants, and Everything In Between: Representations of 
the Monarchy in Post-Genocide Rwanda 
  
Erin Jessee and Sarah E. Watkins 
 
Abstract  
In the post-genocide period, President Paul Kagame and his political party, the 
Rwandan Patriotic Front, are struggling to unite RwandaÕs citizens using, among 
other initiatives, a simplified version of Rwandan history to diminish the ethnic 
tensions that made the 1994 genocide possible. As a result, RwandaÕs history has 
become highly politicized, with vastly divergent versions of the nationÕs past narrated 
in private settings, where it is more politically appropriate for Rwandans to share 
their experiences. This paper focuses on divergent representations of Rwandan 
monarchical figures ## often unnamed ## whom the narrators imbue with values 
according to their individual political affiliations, lived experiences, and identity. 
These narratives are indicative of the broader ways that modern Rwandans narrate 
their experiences of history in response to RwandaÕs current official history, as well 
as previous official histories. Careful analysis reveals much about the current political 
climate in post-genocide Rwanda: most notably, that Rwandans continue to see their 
nationÕs past through vastly different lenses, demonstrating the enormous challenges 
facing the Rwandan government as it seeks to reconcile its population using current 
methods. It also highlights the ongoing need on the part of historians to approach 
contemporary sources critically, informed by sources produced and debated in the 
pre-genocide period. 
 
 2 
Bio-sketch: Erin Jessee is a Lecturer with the Scottish Oral History Centre at the 
University of Strathclyde. She has a PhD in the Humanities from Concordia 
University. Her current book project, tentatively titled Negotiating Genocide: The Politics 
of History in Post-Genocide Rwanda, examines how Rwandan survivors, gnocidaires, 
government officials, and bystanders invoke history to make sense of their post-
genocide lives. Contact: erin.jessee@strath.ac.uk Sarah E. Watkins is a doctoral 
candidate in History and Feminist Studies at the University of California, Santa 
Barbara. Her dissertation explores gendered dynamics of monarchical power in 
Rwanda. Contact: sarah.e.watkins@gmail.com 
 
Introduction1 
The Rwandan monarchy has long been a subject of interest for Rwandan historians, 
and foreign missionaries and scholars, as indicated by the plethora of sources on the 
subject available in Kinyarwanda, French, and English. In most instances, studies of 
the Rwandan monarchy draw upon contemporary oral historical and archival sources 
to inform an understanding of how Rwandans in the past related to the monarchy 
and vice versa. Conversely, this article ## a collaboration between two researchers 
who worked on separate projects in Rwanda between 2007 and 2013 ## draws 
upon oral historical and archival sources to analyze how modern Rwandans 
                                                
1 The authors wish to thank their Rwandan research assistants and participants. We are also 
grateful to Stephan Miescher, Rose-Marie Mukarutabana and two anonymous reviewers for 
providing valuable feedback on earlier drafts of this paper. The preparation and writing of this 
article was funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada; the 
Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada and the Canadian International Development 
AgencyÕs Students for Development Internship; the American Historical Association; and the 
Graduate Division and Department of History at the University of California, Santa Barbara. 
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internalize and evoke a range of social, political and personal factors in their 
representations of the monarchy, and specific monarchical figures, in the everyday.  
We begin by introducing the concept of Òmythico-historyÓ as an appropriate 
framework for making sense of divergent narratives in post-genocide Rwanda.2 
Next, we discuss the methodological foundation that informs current historical 
knowledge of the Rwandan monarchy, with particular emphasis placed on relevant 
oral historical and archival sources as interpreted by historians. We then present 
three mythico-histories related to the Rwandan monarchy as voiced by Rwandans 
from different social, ethnic, and political backgrounds. In each instance, analysis 
reveals that these mythico-histories encode the narratorÕs relationship to the current 
official narrative promoted by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) led by President 
Paul Kagame, and to a lesser extent, the official narratives promoted by the pre-
genocide regimes of Presidents Grgoire Kayibanda (1962##1973) and Juvnal 
Habyarimana (1973##1994). In doing so, we demonstrate the ongoing tensions 
plaguing post-genocide Rwanda related to the politics of history and memory and 
the everyday challenges negotiated by Rwandans. 
 
Post-Genocide Narratives as Mythico-Histories 
The theoretical framework informing this article was first articulated by Liisa Malkki, 
whose work among Hutu refugees of the 1972 Burundian genocide led her to 
identify a range of Òmythico-historiesÓ that her participants used to make sense of 
their pre- and post-genocide lives. Malkki defines the mythico-history as Ònot only a 
description of the past, not even merely an evaluation of the past, but a subversive 
                                                
2 Liisa Malkki, Purity and Exile: Violence, Memory and National Cosmology Among Hutu Refugees in 
Tanzania (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1995). 
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recasting and reinterpretation of it in fundamentally moral terms.Ó3 Her participants, 
who decades later were still living in refugee camps in Tanzania, had developed an 
extreme form of Hutu nationalism that depicted the Tutsi as foreigners who had, 
through trickery and deceit, stolen the nation from its Òrightful natives.Ó4 To this 
end, her participants used a series of mythico-histories to frame their displacement 
Òin opposition to other versions of what was ostensibly the same world, or the same 
pastÓÑthat of the Burundian Tutsi elites.5 In doing so, they reordered their social 
and political world through stories that, while questionable in terms of their 
historical accuracy, nonetheless were psychologically true for the individuals who 
narrated them. 
Using the mythico-history framework to approach narratives in post-genocide 
Rwanda ##as well as other nations in the Great Lakes of Africa region ## is well-
established.6 Of particular relevance to this article, Jennie Burnet has recently cast 
the RPFÕs ongoing program of nationalized commemoration surrounding the 1994 
                                                
3 Malkki, Purity and Exile, 54. 
4 Malkki, Purity and Exile, 3. 
5 Malkki, Purity and Exile, 55. 
6 For example, Marc SommersÕ review of MalkkiÕs work notes the mythico-historyÕs relevance for 
Central Africa and that experts like Ren Lemarchand are applying the concept to their own work. 
In addition, Elizabeth King has adapted the mythico-history to frame memories of Hutu 
discrimination that were related by her Rwandan participants, but which were adapted from the 
lived experiences of their grandparents and parents, while Yolande Bouka has applied it to the 
RPFÕs official narrative surrounding the 1994 genocide and First Congo War. For more 
information, see Marc Sommers, ÒReview of Liisa Malkki, Purity and Exile: Violence, Memory, and 
National Cosmology Among Hutu Refugees in Tazania,Ó American Anthropologist 99##1 (1997), 218; 
Elizabeth King, ÒFrom Data Problems to Data Points: Challenges and Opportunities of Research 
in Postgenocide Rwanda,Ó African Studies Review 52##3 (2009), 127##148; Yolande Bouka, Ò(Oral) 
History of Violence: Conflicting Narratives in Post-Genocide Rwanda,Ó Oral History Forum 
dÕHistoire Orale 33 (2013), 7.  
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genocide as an example of mythico-history in action. She offered two examples of 
the RPF mythico-history: the use of the international communityÕs failure to 
intervene to prevent the genocide as a political weapon against international 
criticisms of the Rwandan government; and the invoking of injured bodies of the 
living and the dead victims of genocide as evidence of the genocide, the international 
communityÕs complicity, and the necessity of RPF leadership for preventing further 
bloodshed.7  
The concept of the mythico-history in action is similarly apt to apply to 
modern narratives of the Rwandan monarchy. RwandaÕs public sphere, as evidenced 
by a plethora of government-funded museum exhibits, genocide memorials, 
transitional justice mechanisms and educational materials aimed at educating the 
public and promoting national unity and reconciliation, is dominated by an image of 
RwandaÕs precolonial past as relatively utopian: its people united under a monarchy 
that, for the most part, was successful at maintaining peace and stability in the 
region. As part of this official narrative, Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa ethnic identities were 
introduced by the German and Belgian colonizers in the early twentieth century, 
setting Rwanda on an irreversible path toward the 1994 genocide, in which an 
estimated one million Tutsi were brutally murdered.8 However, as the following 
discussion reveals, the subject of the Rwandan monarchy is fraught with 
historiographic debate, and its interpretation by modern Rwandans far more 
complicated than indicated by the RPFÕs official history. 
 
                                                
7 Jennie Burnet, ÒWhose Genocide? Whose Truth? Representations of Victim and Perpetrator in 
Rwanda,Ó in: Alexander Hinton and Kevin OÕNeill (eds.), Genocide: Truth, Memory, and Representation 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2009), ADD PAGE NUMBERS CHAPTER 96. 
8 Sources from outside Rwanda cite the actual number of victims of the 1994 genocide at between 
500,000 to 800,000 Rwandans, including Tutsi, Hutu, and Twa civilians. See, for example: Alison 
Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999).  
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Oral/Archival Sources on the Rwandan Monarchy 
Much of what is known about the Rwandan monarchy and its impact on the 
everyday lives of Rwandans emerges from the work of historians, most notably 
Alexis Kagame, Jan Vansina, and David Newbury, whose analysis relies upon 
engagement with rich oral sources. There are four main types of oral sources with 
which historians work: ubwiru (rituals), ubucurabwenge (dynastic lists), ibisigo (dynastic 
poetry), and ibitekerezo (historical narratives). The ubwiru are in some ways the most 
famous of these, but also the most secret. They were memorized by the abiru (ritual 
practitioners), a group that acted both as priests ## performing the rituals ## as 
well as a council of advisors to the mwami (king), who was the chief ritual practitioner 
in the kingdom.9 Court genealogists, the abacurabwenge, kept the dynastic lists. The 
ibisigo, or dynastic poetry, was kept by the abasizi, who belonged mostly to the Singa 
clan. Alexis Kagame belonged to the Singa clan, and recorded these traditions. This 
gave him access to King Rudahigwa, and to the abiru.10 It is clear he did extensive 
                                                
9 These rituals were compiled and analyzed as they were performed during the colonial period. See: 
Andr Coupez and Marcel dÕHertefelt, La Royaut Sacre de lÕAncien Rwanda: Texte, Traduction et 
Commentaire de son Rituel, (Tervuren: Muse Royal de lÕAfrique Centrale, 1964); David NewburyÕs 
analysis of the ÒFirst FruitsÓ ritual is important for understanding how these rituals helped to 
construct community and identity. See: David S. Newbury, ÒWhat Role Has Kingship?: An 
Analysis of the Umuganura Ritual of Rwanda as Presented in Marcel dÕHertefelt and Andre Coupez 
La Royaute Sacree de lÕAncien Rwanda (1964),Ó Africa-Tervuren 27##4 (1981), 89##101. 
10 As a matridynastic clan, it is unlikely that the Singa were actually part of the abiru. Rwandan 
scholar Rose-Marie Mukarutabana argues that the Singa had a Òquasi-monopolyÓ over the ibisigo, 
dynastic poetry. Personal communication WITH JESSEE OR WEATKINS??, January 2014. 
Meanwhile, the incorporation of the abiru at the royal? court seems to date from the reign of 
Gisanura, which Vansina places sometime between 1700 and 1735. The genealogy and dating of 
the Nyginya dynasty has been a matter of much discussion among historians of Rwanda. See: Lon 
Delmas, Gnalogies de la Noblesse du Ruanda (Les Batutsi), (Kabgayi: Vicariat apostolique du Ruanda, 
1950); Alexis Kagame, La notion de gnration applique  la gnalogie dynastique et  lÕhistoire du Rwanda 
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interviews and perhaps took careful fieldnotes as well.11 But he never revealed the 
identities of his informants, nor did he explain their backgrounds.12 They may have 
included ibitekerezo, or ubwiru. It is likely, though, that he relied mostly upon ibisigo.13 
This makes a critical analysis of KagameÕs work challenging, since it is difficult to 
know the type of source and from whom it was obtained except in those instances in 
which Kagame directly attributes information to particular informants. 
In comparison, Jan VansinaÕs work is predominantly based on ibitekerezo.14 
Though these were also somewhat controlled by the court, they also disseminated 
                                                                                                                                                     
des Xe-XIe sicles  nos jours, par lÕabb Alexis Kagame (Bruxelles: PUBLISHER ?, 1959); Bernardin 
Muzungu, Histoire du Rwanda Prcolonial, (Paris: LÕHarmattan, 2003); David S. Newbury, ÒTrick 
Cyclists? Reconceptualizing Rwandan Dynastic Chronology,Ó History in Africa 21 (1994), 
191##217; J.K. FULL NAME AVAILABLE ?? Rennie, ÒThe Precolonial Kingdom of Rwanda: 
A Reinterpretation,Ó Transafrican Journal of History 2##2 (1972), ADD PAGE NUMBERS; Jan 
Vansina, LÕvolution du Royaume Rwanda des Origines a! 1900 (Bruxelles: Acade!mie Royale des 
Sciences dÕOutre-Mer, 2000). For more on the incorporation of the abiru into the Nyiginya 
Kingdom, see: David S. Newbury, ÒWhat Role Has Kingship?;Ó Vansina, Antecedents to Modern 
Rwanda: The Nyiginya Kingdom (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2004), especially Chapter 4. 
11 These notes are reportedly held in the Abb Alexis Kagame Library in Butare. As of November 
2012, they were unavailable to researchers, whether Rwandan or foreign. 
12 Jan Vansina, ÒHistorical Tales,Ó History in Africa 27 (2000), 375##414. 
13 For more on the differences between oral sources and their interpretations, see: Coupez and 
dÕHertefelt, La Royaut Sacre; Vansina, ÒHistorical Tales.Ó For some examples and theories on 
KagameÕs sources, see: Alexis Kagame and Pierre Charles, La Posie Dynastique au Rwanda, par Alexis 
Kagame (Bruxelles: G. van Campenhout, 1951); Alexis Kagame and Grard Nyilimanzi, Ibisigo comme 
source de lÕhistoire (Kigali: Cahiers Lumiere et Societ, 2003). 
14 Vansina contrasts his ibitekerezo with what he refers to as Òofficial historiesÓ offered by court-
based collaborators of Peter Schumacher, who worked in Rwanda IN WHICH DECADE?. See: 
Vansina, Antecedents, 7##8; Jan Vansina, LÕévolution. For Schumacher, see: Kayijuka, 
ÒLebensgeschichte des Grossfrsten Kayijuka und Seiner Ahnen Seit Sultan Yuhi Mazimpaka, 
Knig von Ruanda. Von Ihm Selbst Erzhlt. Translated by Dr. Peter Schumacher, M.A.,Ó 
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throughout the population, since non-elites also worked at the court.15 Thus there 
were both official ibitekerezo, as well as popular versions that included personal and 
regional embellishments. In some ways, VansinaÕs work built upon KagameÕs.16 But 
he challenged KagameÕs chronology, for example, as well as his interpretation of the 
older, mythological narratives. Vansina also included regional and local narratives in 
his collection of ibitekerezo, which helps to contextualize his monarchical history 
beyond the add: royal? court narratives.17  
David NewburyÕs contribution has been to place the Rwandan monarchy 
within a regional context and to further critique KagameÕs presentation of an official 
dynastic history of the Nyiginya monarchy as a national Rwandan history. Newbury 
argues that the monarchy was an example of ritual kingship.18 The mwami was not a 
god, but rather the earthly conduit through which spiritual blessings flowed into the 
kingdom.19 He was bound by a cyclical series of rituals performed in various parts of 
                                                                                                                                                     
Mitteilungen der Ausland-Hochschule an der Universitt Berlin 41 (Afrikanischen Studien) (1938), 
103##161. 
15 The most famous of these is the tanner Gakanisha, who was the sole information for Coupez 
and KamanziÕs book of ibitekerezo. See: Andr Coupez, Th. Kamanzi and Clment Gakanisha, 
Recits Historiques Rwanda (Tervuren: Muse Royal de lÕAfrique Centrale, 1962). This was also likely 
the type of story that informed Peter SchumacherÕs famous narrator Kayijuka, several decades 
prior to Coupez and Kamanzi. Kayijuka. ÒLebensgeschichte,Ó (1938). 
16 See Vansina, Antecedents, in which KagameÕs work is among the most frequently cited sources. 
17 Vansina, ÒHistorical Tales;Ó Vansina, Antecedents. 
18 David S. Newbury, Kings and Clans: Ijwi Island and the Lake Kivu Rift, 1780-1840 (Madison WI: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1991). See also: D. Newbury, ÒWhat Role Has Kingship?Ó 
19 This interpretation may seem confusing FOR CHRISTIANS? in a modern-day context, 
depending on oneÕs theological interpretation of the Christian Trinity and the role of Jesus Christ 
therein. I DONÕT SEE THIS POINT. TO ME, IT HAS NOT ANYTHING TO DO 
WITH CHRISTIANITY.  EXPLAIN, PLEASE. However, the pre-colonial conception of the 
mwami was that of the chief ritual practitioner, and one who existed between the mortal inhabitants 
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the country to ensure prosperity and fertility, his body being an essential part of 
these rituals, up to and including burial.20 Newbury widens the analysis of political 
development to place Rwanda within the context of its region, including what is now 
eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, and especially Ijwi Island, which lies in Lake 
Kivu. 
Archival sources on Rwanda become relevant from 1897 when Germany 
claimed Rwanda as part of German East Africa. However, the German government 
expended few resources in its colonial holding, and did not endeavor to change pre-
existing social or political structures. Instead, they lent support to one side of a 
succession dispute that began in 1895 with the death of Rwabugiri by giving military 
resources to Musinga, who ascended the throne in 1896.21 It is unlikely that Musinga 
could have held the throne without German support, but a few months after his 
accession, von Ramsay, a German officer, appeared at court and proposed an 
alliance between the king and the colonial authorities that MusingaÕs mother, 
                                                                                                                                                     
of Rwanda and Imaana, the supernatural heavens. See, for example: Kagame and Charles, La Posie 
Dynastique, particularly no. 65, no. 66, and no. 67. 
20 Coupez and dÕHertefeltÕs collection of the rituals is most important here, but other have also 
offered interpretation and analysis of the cyclical nature of the royal rituals and their importance in 
the cosmological structure of the Nyiginya kingdom. See: Coupez and dÕHertefelt, La royaute sacre; 
D. Newbury, ÒWhat Role Has Kingship?:Ó Vansina, Antecedents, especially 91##93. Christopher 
Taylor has also written extensively about the symbolic capital surrounding the kingÕs body in pre-
colonial and colonial Rwanda rituals. See: Christopher Taylor, Sacrifice as Terror: The Rwandan 
Genocide of 1994 (Oxford: Berg Publishers, 1999); Christopher Taylor, Milk, Honey and Money: 
Changing Concepts in Rwandan Healing (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1992).  
21 Vansina, Antecedents, 2004. The coup that resulted in MusingaÕs enthronement is often 
remembered as one of the bloodiest events in Rwanda history up until the genocide. See also: 
Alison Des Forges, Defeat is the Only Bad News: Rwanda Under Musinga, 1896##1931 (Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 2011). For an example of a popular remembrance, see: E.FULL 
NAME KNOWN? Ruhashya, Rucunshu ([Kigali?]: Imprimerie nationale du Rwanda, 1984). 
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Kanjogera, immediately accepted.22 In placing her own son on the throne, she 
solidified her Abakagara lineage of the Ega clan as the most powerful in the 
kingdom, eclipsing in a variety of ways the power of the reigning Nyiginya.23 Thus 
began RwandaÕs colonial era.  
 German colonization was short-lived. During World War I, the Belgians took 
control of the colony, soon to be joined with Burundi and renamed Ruanda-Urundi. 
Unlike their colonial predecessors, the Belgians were determined to homogenize 
what had previously been a small, central kingdom that controlled the surrounding 
communities through assimilation and military force, and which was a diverse 
territory in terms of identity and power.24 The Belgian administration was buffered 
by pseudoscientific theories that identified the Tutsi minority to be descendants of 
the biblical figure Ham, and therefore more ÒCaucasianÓ than their pure African 
Hutu and Twa compatriots. It concluded that the Tutsi were more intelligent and 
that a Tutsi-dominated social hierarchy was therefore natural.25 In doing so, they 
                                                
22 Des Forges, Defeat is the Only Bad News. 
23 Kanjogera was already queen-mother (umugabekazi) for the previous mwami, Rutarindwa, who was 
not her biological son. It was not enough for her to simply be umugabekazi; rather, as a descendant 
of the powerful Abakagara lineage of the Ega clan, her ambitions included strengthening her 
familyÕs position as well, which is why she participated in the coup that overthrew Rutarindwa in 
1896 and established her own son as mwami. In this way, she was very much the ideological heir of 
her father, Rwakagara, as well as his sister and her own predecessor as queen-mother, Nyiramongi. 
See: Sarah E. Watkins, ÒIron Mothers and Warrior Lovers: Intimacy, Power, and the State in 
Rwanda, 1796##1912,Ó PhD Dissertation, Santa Barbara (University of California, 2014), 
especially Chapter 4. 
24 Catharine Newbury, The Cohesion of Oppression: Clientship and Ethnicity in Rwanda, 1860##1960 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1988). 
25 For an excellent analysis which highlights the missionary origins of the Hamitic Hypothesis, see 
Edith R. Sanders, ÒThe Hamitic Hypothesis: Its Origin and Functions in Time Perspective,Ó Journal 
of African History 10##4 (1969), 521##532. 
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eliminated all available avenues to power for Hutu, including streamlining 
chieftainship into a single hierarchy that governed agriculture, pastoralism, and the 
army, and removing all existing Hutu chiefs.26  
The period after the Second World War brought new realities for European 
colonial powers, and the newly-formed United Nations renewed BelgiumÕs 
administration of Rwanda as a Trust Territory. Under this mandate, the Belgians 
were tasked with preparing Rwanda for eventual independence. This created many 
factions within the country, mostly splitting along ethnic lines. The situation grew 
more tense throughout the 1950s, and the sudden and rather mysterious death of the 
mwami Rudahigwa in 1959 set off a series of violent conflicts around the country. 
The Belgians, anxious to relieve themselves of the burden of their small Trust 
Territory, and distracted by events in neighboring Congo, implemented a final series 
of elections. 
This was the first opportunity since the pre-colonial period that Hutu had to 
lead the nation. Despite reports to the United Nations Visiting Mission by the 
Belgian administration and complaints among Tutsi parties that this model for 
governance was ineffective, the Hutu parties won 83.84% of the vote during the 
1960 election for communal representation.27 These elections established the 
Rwanda Provisional Government, which took control of internal governance of the 
country as of 25 January 1961. Full independence from Belgium was then achieved 
under almost exclusively Hutu leadership on 1 July 1962. The period from 1959 to 
1962 was marked by widespread anti-Tutsi violence, and many Tutsi fled to 
neighboring countries or even Europe or North America. Subsequent waves of Tutsi 
                                                
26 Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi Information and Public Relations Office, Ruanda-Urundi: 
Geography and History (TOWN? PUBLISHER? 1960), 72. See also TaylorÕs discussion of the 
Hamitic hypothesis in Sacrifice as Terror. 
27 Mary Catherine Atterbury, ÒRevolution in RwandaÓ (Madison WI: African Studies Program ## 
University of Wisconsin, 1970), 76. 
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exiles would follow related periods of political tension and violence in 1963 and 
1964, and again in 1973 surrounding HabyarimanaÕs rise to power, though 
Habyarimana himself condemned this violence and worked to protect Tutsi who 
remained in Rwanda. Cumulatively, these Tutsi are often referred to as Òold-caseload 
refugeesÓ to differentiate them from refugees who fled the 1994 genocide and 
subsequent conquest by the RPF, though each wave of refugees took on its own 
unique character. The timing of each groupÕs flight was determined by distinct 
circumstances, often unique to political turmoil in particular parts of the country. 
This, too, impacted where specific Tutsi groups chose to flee and to resettle.28 
 
On Methodology 
The methodological framework underlying this paper relies primarily upon life 
history and thematic interviews with over one hundred Rwandans from a range of 
social, political, economic, ethnic, and regional backgrounds.29 In incorporating 
interviews into our fieldwork, we were following Lynn Abrams and other oral 
historians who approach oral history as both a research methodology and an end 
result that are distinct from the use of oral sources in other disciplinary settings.30 A 
budding sub-discipline that bridges a range of social scientists and community-based 
practitioners, oral historians rely primarily on the collection, analysis and 
dissemination of life history and thematic interviews as a means of engaging with 
                                                
28 See Jean-Pierre Chrtien, The Great Lakes of Africa: Two Thousand Years of History (New York: Zone 
Books, 2003); Rene Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970); C. 
Newbury, The Cohesion of Oppression; Filip Reyntjens, Pouvoir et Droit au Rwanda: Droit Public Et 
Evolution Politique, 1916##1973 (Tervuren: Muse!e Royal de lÕAfrique Centrale, 1985).  
29 Pseudonyms are used throughout this article in order to maintain the confidentiality of our 
participants. In addition, we refrain from including personally identifying information.  
30 Lynn Abrams, Oral History Theory (New York: Routledge, 2010). 
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those versions of the past that are largely absent from official sources of historical 
knowledge, resulting in an intimate Òview from below.Ó To this end, Rwandan 
participants were recruited by seeking out both professional historians and Òorganic 
intellectualsÓ ## community-recognized leaders with expertise in local histories, 
storytelling and culture, rather than government-approved experts ## in a range of 
settings, as well as ordinary civilians who felt they had a story to tell.31 We then 
sought out additional participants by asking participants to recommend people from 
their communities who could enhance our understanding of Rwandan history, or a 
particular event. All consenting participants were interviewed, including government 
officials, to allow for a more nuanced understanding of Rwandan history.  
After establishing informed consent with our participants, we conducted life 
history interviews. In these initial interviews, participants were encouraged to narrate 
their life experiences in as little or as much detail as was necessary for us to 
understand how their past and present circumstances might influence their 
narratives. As such, we asked few questions, instead preferring to have our 
participants tell us about themselves and their experiences on their own terms and 
touch on those events that they felt were most important to them, rather than our 
research agendas.  
Once participants concluded that their life stories had been narrated in 
sufficient detail, subsequent conversations took the form of thematic interviews in 
                                                
31 This group was incredibly diverse. In some cases, these were university-trained historians who 
had done community-based work. Others were singers and storytellers whose knowledge and 
ability to communicate histories made them prominent members of communities, including those 
in various diasporas. The last category included rural and poor urban residents, often semi-literate 
or illiterate, who were considered as important sources of historical information and analysis by 
others on their hill or in their neighbourhood. For further analysis of a similar case to this last 
group, see: Steven Feierman, Peasant Intellectuals: Anthropology and History in Tanzania (Madison WI: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1990). 
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which we asked questions tailored to our participantsÕ backgrounds while 
simultaneously addressing our particular research interests. By the end of our 
fieldwork, we had conducted as many as six formal interviews with each participant. 
This approach was influenced by Henry Greenspan, whose decades of work among 
Holocaust survivors now living in the United States highlights the value of oral 
sources, particularly when the practitioner is able to revisit the survivorsÕ experiences 
several times over a period of weeks, months, or even years.32 
Greenspan advocates conducting multiple interviews with each individual so 
that over time the listener comes to understand the greater historical, political, 
cultural and social contexts that influence an individualÕs interpretations of their 
experiences over time. This approach simultaneously allows the listener to engage in 
two central tenets of oral historical practice. First, it encourages Òdeep listening,Ó 
whereby the researcher seeks to engage not only with the words being uttered, but 
with the deeper meaning inherent in the narrative as a whole.33 Second, it enables 
                                                
32 The use of Greenspan in this instance is not intended to imply that the authors believe that 
insights based on the Holocaust are automatically relevant to Rwanda due to a shared experience 
of genocide. Instead, it is intended to demonstrate that the use of life history interviews, and 
indeed, the strategy of conducting multiple interviews with a single participant over a period of 
time can greatly enhance our understanding of the political and social forces that shape how people 
narrate their lived experiences. 
33 For more on deep listening, see: Alessandro Portelli, They Say in Harlan County: An Oral History 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2010); Alessandro Portelli, ÒWhat Makes Oral History 
Different,Ó in: Robert Perks and Alistair Thomson (eds.), The Oral History Reader, Second Edition 
(New York: Routledge, 2006), 32##42; Alessandro Portelli, The Order Has Been Carried Out: History, 
Memory, and Meaning of a Nazi Massacre in Rome (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003); Alessandro 
Portelli, The Death of Luigi Trastulli and Other Stories: Form and Meaning in Oral History (New York: 
State University of New York Press, 1991); Paul Thompson, ÒThe Voice of the Past: Oral 
History,Ó in: Robert Perks and Alistair Thomson (eds.), The Oral History Reader, Second Edition (New 
York: Routledge, 2006), 25##31; Paul Thompson, The Voice of the Past: Oral History (Oxford: 
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practitioners to share authority with their participants to establish a common 
understanding of events.34 In doing so, it engages with and builds upon crucial 
dialogue initiated by Africanist historians in the 1990s, which prompted practitioners 
to speak with, rather than for, their African interlocutors, and to acknowledge the 
different reliability of African oral histories and traditions, as complimentary to other 
ways of knowing about the continentÕs history.35 
To these insights, we would add that the resulting testimonies may speak 
volumes about not only what the listener anticipates hearing, but also about what 
Rwandans anticipate local authorities might want to hear, should the contents of the 
interviews ever become public knowledge. This expansion of GreenspanÕs approach 
acknowledges that many Rwandans find themselves torn between narrating their 
lived experiences on one hand, and remaining faithful to the RPFÕs official narrative 
of RwandaÕs past and present on the other, lest they be identified within the 
community as potential political dissidents.36 
                                                                                                                                                     
Oxford University Press, 1988); Luisa Passerini, Fascism in Popular Memory: The Cultural Experiences of 
the Turin Working-Class (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). 
34 For more on sharing authority, see: Michael Frisch, A Shared Authority: Essays on the Craft and 
Meaning of Oral and Public History (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990); Steven High, 
ÒSharing Authority: An Introduction,Ó Journal of Canadian Studies 43##1 (2009), 12##34; Steven 
High, Lisa Ndejuru and Kristen OÕHare (eds.), ÒSpecial Issues on Sharing Authority: Community-
University Collaboration in Oral History, Digital Storytelling, and Engaged Scholarship,Ó Journal of 
Canadian Studies 43##1 (2009), PLEASE ADD PAGE NUMBERS. 
35 See, for example: David W. Cohen, Stephan F. Miescher and Luise White, ÒIntroduction: Voices, 
Words, and African HistoryÓ in: Luise White, Stephan F. Miescher and David W. Cohen (eds.), 
African Words, African Voices: Critical Practices in Oral History (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
2001), 1##30. 
36 For more on the methodological challenges and limitations of conducting oral historical research 
in post-genocide Rwanda, and when working with narratives that are politically sensitive, see: Erin 
Jessee, ÒThe Limits of Oral History: Ethics and Methodological Amid Highly Politicized Research 
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In instances where formal recorded interviews were not possible, the 
empirical evidence underlying this paper is enhanced by ethnography, which Karen 
OÕReilly defines as 
 
a family of methods, involving direct and sustained contact with human agents 
within the context of their daily lives (and cultures), watching what happens, 
listening to what is said, and asking questions. (É) It results in richly written 
accounts that respect the irreducibility of human experience (É) acknowledges 
the role of theory (É) as well as the researcherÕs own role (É) and views 
human as part object / part subject.37 
 
To this end, the authors have been periodically immersed in everyday life in post-
genocide Rwanda and have engaged in a range of ethnographic methods aimed at 
documenting and analyzing informal encounters and the nationÕs rapidly shifting 
political climate. Jennie BurnetÕs discussion of intersubjectivity ## in her study Òthe 
dialogue and interactions between the anthropologist, her research topic, and her 
research participants as well as between the conflicting points of view of her 
research participantsÓ ## is particularly salient.38 Intersubjectivity emerges from a 
                                                                                                                                                     
Settings,Ó Oral History Review 38##2 (2011), 287##307; Marc Sommers, Stuck: Rwandan Youth and 
the Struggle for Adulthood (Athens GA: University of Georgia Press, 2012); Susan Thomson, 
Whispering Truth to Power: Everyday Resistance to Reconciliation in Postgenocide Rwanda (Madison WI: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 2013). 
37 Karen OÕReilly, Key Concepts in Ethnography (London: Sage Publications, 2009), 3 ## emphasis in 
original. 
38 Jennie Burnet, Genocide Lives in Us: Women, Memory, and Silence in Rwanda (Madison WI: University 
of Wisconsin Press, 2012), 35 ## her discussion on intersubjectivity builds upon work by Pierre 
Bourdieu and James Clifford. 
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combination of self-reflection on the part of the researcher, daily immersive 
interactions with participants, and the contrasting of different voices and 
perspectives as part of the final analysis. This requires the ethnographer to consider 
his/her own subjectivity: past experiences, and relationships with participants, 
disciplinary background(s), research questions, and the case study intended to 
investigate. This is typically accomplished through the writing of fieldnotes ## a 
process that involves thorough documentation of field experiences in as much detail 
as humanly possible, while simultaneously reflecting on how each encounter 
potentially shifts the course taken by the research project.39 The subsequent analysis 
is a messy process involving sorting and coding the resulting data ## including 
photographs, fieldnotes, audio and video recordings, and more ## and identifying 
key themes or contradictions that respond to the guiding research questions and 
advance critical theory.  
The resulting fieldwork has been necessarily multi-sited.40 During different 
fieldwork trips, the authors have been based in Kigali (the national capital), Butare 
(RwandaÕs cultural center), and Kibuye (a town in western Rwanda). In addition, we 
made numerous trips beyond these more accessible communities to engage with the 
experiences and perspectives of Rwandans from rural communities, allowing for a 
more diverse range of economic, regional, and political backgrounds among our 
participants. For this reason, our approach necessitated certain compromises. We 
were rarely able to immerse ourselves in the daily lives of our participants, in part 
due to our decision to travel within the country to reach a wider range of 
experiences, and also in part because of our commitment to researching Rwandan 
                                                
39 Julian Murchison, Ethnography Essentials: Designing, Conducting, and Presenting Your Research (San 
Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2010). 
40 For more information on multi-sited ethnography, see: Ulf Hannerz, ÒBeing ThereÉ and 
ThereÉ and There! Reflections on Multi-Site Ethnography,Ó Ethnography 4##2 (2003), 201##216. 
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communities where the prolonged presence of a foreign researcher could provoke 
unwanted attention from the Rwandan government and endanger participants. And 
in the neighborhoods where we lived, our inability to speak fluent Kinyarwanda 
impeded our ability to communicate directly with our neighbors, who spoke little 
English. French was an option; however, the French language has become 
increasingly unpopular among Rwandans due to the RPFÕs decision to adopt English 
as its second language.41 As a result, we worked closely with Rwandan research 
assistants who provided simultaneous translation during interviews and transcription 
of recorded interviews from Kinyarwanda to English. 
 
Mythico-History 1: The Good King 
One of many diasporic communities that have fled Rwanda in recent years are the 
old case-load refugees who fled anti-Tutsi violence in waves from the 1959 Hutu 
Revolution to HabyarimanaÕs 1973 coup. These refugees often maintained intimate 
ties to the monarchy.42 For them, the monarchy is often a source of honor, and the 
memory of it evokes strong feelings of kinship, nostalgia and integrity, particularly in 
relation to the heightened ethnic tensions and economic decline of the Kayibanda 
and Habyarimana regimes. Among this community, the story of The Good King ## 
a colonial-era confrontation at Hotel Faucon ## circulates as evidence of the 
benevolent and ultimately superior leadership of Tutsi monarchy. A Rwandan 
                                                
41 In Kigali in particular, many Rwandans do not want to be seen speaking French, as doing so 
affiliates them with the francophone regimes of Habyarimana and Kayibanda and places them in a 
precarious political position. Cf. Izebela Steflja, ÒThe Costs and Consequences of RwandaÕs Shift 
in Language Policy,Ó African Portal 30 (2012), 1##10 
(http://www.africaportal.org/articles/2012/05/31/costs-and-consequences-
rwanda%E2%80%99s-shift-language-policy, accessed 6 June 2013). 
42 See also: Burnet, Genocide Lives in Us, 15.  
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historian, herself an old case-load refugee who has since YEAR MISSING? 
returned to Rwanda, narrated the event as follows to one of us: 
 
Hotel Faucon was owned by a Belgian settler called Faucon, who had placed a 
sign at the entrance, reading ÒInterdit aux chiens et au noirs.Ó When King Mutara 
Rudahigwa saw the sign, he strode over and removed it himself. When the 
owner came out and began to protest, the king slapped him and threatened him 
with worse if he did not stop this insulting nonsense. The king had been 
stopping at the hotel, and the sign had not been meant to exclude him. But he 
could not accept segregation against anyone at all. From that day, segregation in 
public spaces ended throughout the country. 
 
When asked if the monarchy had been good for Rwanda, this incident was often 
cited by returnees as an example of why it was, and why, according to two 
interviewees, most Rwandans had voted to maintain the monarchy in the 1962 
referendum. This interpretation is, of course, challenged by historical facts: the 
monarchists were defeated in the referendum, and a republican system was 
established to replace Belgian colonial administration. Further, the abolition of the 
monarchy was functionally achieved after the 1960 elections of mayors 
(ÒbourgmestresÓ in the Belgian system) and local council members. These newly-
elected officials ## who were majority Hutu, reflecting the reality of the country ## 
were escorted by the Belgians to a safe meeting place in Gitarama on 28 January 
1961. Here, the elected representatives proclaimed the Republic. Due to opposition 
to this so-called ÒCoup of GitaramaÓ by the United Nations (under whose aegis 
Belgium administered Rwanda as a Trust Territory), a referendum was held in 1962 
that formally ended the monarchy. But Kigeli V Ndahindurwa fled to Tanganyika 
following the Coup of Gitarama, essentially ending RwandaÕs monarchy. 
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Nonetheless, the myth that the monarchists won, prompting the Belgians to tamper 
with the election results, persists among to the narratives of many old-caseload 
returnees despite these historical events. 
The collective historical memory of diaspora populations presents a unique 
challenge for historians. Liisa Malkki argues that refugees have been represented in 
the scholarly literature as Òstripped of the specificity of culture, place, and history, [the 
refugee] is human in the most basic, elementary sense. The refugee as bare humanity 
stands, we imagine, for all of us at our most naked and basic level.Ó43 But as MalkkiÕs 
research shows, refugees are not the tabula rasa of humanity ## they are people who 
lived in a specific context, left for specific reasons, and now live within another 
context. They are aware of their surroundings and historical moment. Most 
importantly, Malkki reveals that refugees exercise agency by constructing their own 
narratives and identities within their new context. This final point is of utmost 
importance for understanding narratives of The Good King. 
Rwandan Tutsi, and particularly those closely affiliated within the monarchy, 
were understandably afraid for their safety surrounding the Hutu Revolution. The 
Belgians were distracted by ongoing violence in the neighboring Congo, where they 
had larger economic and strategic interests, and regardless, were unlikely to spend 
very much time worrying about backlash against RwandaÕs royal family and its 
supporters. Members of the royal family fled to Burundi, Kenya, Tanzania, and 
Uganda. Many hoped they would soon be able to return.  
A ÒprincessÓ of MusingaÕs clan turned prominent storyteller had much to say 
about this narrative of The Good King. She grew up in a small village in central 
Rwanda and was quick to dismiss perceptions that she had enjoyed the privileges of 
the royal court as a girl. She instead emphasized the humble life her family had led as 
farmers and small-scale pastoralists. She claimed that Musinga probably Òdid not 
                                                
43 Malkki, Purity and Exile, 12 ## emphasis in the original. 
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know her name.Ó Yet despite this humble life, she was privately educated ## a 
privilege, especially for girls, during the colonial period ## and received her 
university education at the National University of Rwanda. Furthermore, among old 
case-load refugees, she was commonly recognized as The Princess, DOESNÕT 
THIS BRING HER ANONYMITY IN DANGER? demonstrating a lingering 
respect for her heritage. 
When Rudahigwa died in 1959, The Princess married a civil servant in the 
colonial regime. Concerned for his familyÕs safety, her husband sent her to 
Bujumbura to wait until the violence subsided, but eventually it became clear that 
return was not a safe option. For Tutsi who stayed in Rwanda after 1962, life was 
perilous. The Kayibanda regime systematically removed Tutsi from positions of 
power, creating a general atmosphere of anti-Tutsi discrimination. When 
Habyarimana overthrew the Kayibanda regime in 1973, more Tutsi fled, fearing 
further backlash within their communities. At this point, The PrincessÕs husband 
joined her in Bujumbura. They lived in exile until 1996, when the relative stability of 
the RPF regime made it possible for them to return to Rwanda. 
As exiles, many old case-load refugees began sharing stories. In Bujumbura, 
The Princess gained a following, earning a reputation as a guardian of Rwandan 
history and culture. A popular belief, likely bolstered by The PrincessÕs storytelling, 
was that the Belgian administrators had falsified the results of the referendum, and 
that Rwandans had actually voted overwhelmingly to preserve the monarchy. 
Conversations with her, as well as other former exiles from Bujumbura, Nairobi, and 
Dar es Salaam, characterized Rwandans as having loved the monarchy, and that only 
a handful of ÒradicalsÓ had fought to have it abolished. Those radicals were often 
characterized by The Princess?? Or by all case-load refugees? as proponents of 
Ògenocide ideology,Ó referencing a controversial legal prohibition introduced by the 
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RPF to condemn acts intended to promote Òethnic divisionismÓ or minimize the 
severity of the 1994 genocide.44 
When asked why people loved the monarchy, and why the Belgians would 
have favored Hutu leadership, responses offered by old case-load returnees mostly 
aligned: ÒThe King [Rudahigwa] stood up to them and refused to see his people 
divided.Ó ÒThe KingÓ in all of these discussions reference Rudahigwa, The Good 
King. When we asked about other kings, either Musinga or Ndahindurwa, the 
narrators would always bring the discussion back to Rudahigwa, pointing to his 
principled stance against European-imposed ethnic and racial segregation. 
 
Mythico-History 2: Bloody Tyrants 
ÒGnocidaires,Ó a distinctly Rwandan term used in reference to people who were 
convicted and imprisoned for committing serious crimes during the 1994 genocide, 
proved less conflicted in their representations of the Rwandan monarchy, which in 
their narratives was uniformly approached as a specifically Tutsi institution that was 
notable for its systemic oppression of the Hutu masses.45 From their vantage point 
                                                
44 Law No. 18/2008 defines genocide ideology as Òan aggregate of thoughts characterized by 
conduct, speeches, documents and other acts aiming at exterminating or inciting others to 
exterminate people basing [sic] on ethnic group, origin, nationality, region, color, physical 
appearance, sex, language, religion or political opinion, committed in normal periods or during 
war.Ó The prohibition against genocide ideology ## first mentioned in the 2003 Constitution, but 
not proscribed by law until 2008 ## is controversial due to the vague definition of the term and its 
widespread application to individuals who attempt to shed light on the RPFÕs various human rights 
abuses and lacking democratic reforms. Amnesty International, ÒRwanda: Safer to Stay Silent: The 
Chilling Effect of RwandaÕs Laws on ÔGenocide IdeologyÕ and ÔSectarianismÕÓ (New York: 
Amnesty International Report, 2010) 
(http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AFR47/005/2010/en, accessed 27 May 2013). 
45 This term is adapted from the French Ògnocideur.Ó 
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in the Rwandan prison system, they tended to speak of Òthe kingÓ as though only 
one king had ruled pre-colonial Rwanda, leaving little room to explore the specific 
personality traits or policies of individual monarchs and their advisors. Under the 
circumstances, gnocidaires described the ÒTutsi kingÓ or ÒTutsi monarchyÓ as 
uniformly evil, and as responsible for maintaining the economic, political, and ritual 
supremacy of the Tutsi minority at the expense of the Hutu majority. One prevalent 
story portrays the king as particularly bloodthirsty. Michel, a salesman, related the 
story of a Tutsi king who supported himself as he stood by planting his spear in the 
bodies of Hutu children. The children presumably died as a result of being 
mistreated in this manner. However, Michel remarked that this was inconsequential, 
as the king regularly sacrificed Hutu civilians for no reason other than they were 
inferior. 
Philippe, a history teacher, related a similar story. However, where other 
gnocidaires attributed this behavior to the king, Philippe claimed it was Òthe Queen 
MotherÓ who had abused Hutu children so abominably. Philippe was quick to 
accuse Rwandan women ## regardless of age, ethnicity, economic status, or regional 
background ## of poisoning people or manipulating their husbands and other men 
to commit criminal acts on their behalf, revealing a preoccupation with Rwandan 
women as poisoners, conspirators, and manipulators. His decision to attribute this 
behavior to the queen mother may have been rooted in his affiliation with the Hutu 
Power movement, which condemns Tutsi women for using their beauty, intelligence 
and good manners to trick Hutu men into servitude.46 Conversely, it may have 
emerged from the negative qualities attributed to Kanjogera, who in Rwandan 
history is remembered as an ambitious and bloodthirsty woman who not only 
facilitated German colonial ambitions, but conspired to murder those who 
                                                
46 Malkki, Purity and Exile. 
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challenged her sonÕs leadership using a large sword with which she was buried after 
her death.47 
Variations on this iconic story were repeated by gnocidaires across Rwanda 
to justify their participation in the genocide, and demonstrate the need for ongoing 
Hutu resistance to Tutsi oppression. Gnocidaires often described the RPF and its 
treatment of the Hutu majority as a modern incarnation of the Tutsi monarchy, and 
therefore, Hutu oppression. They cited the ÒfactÓ that President Paul Kagame was 
descended from the Nyiginya clan as evidence that Rwanda was in the grips of a new 
Tutsi hegemony.48 Such sentiments were further influenced by personal experiences 
of mass atrocities perpetrated by RPF troops during RwandaÕs 1990 to 1994 civil war 
and in the post-genocide period, family stories of the suffering endured under the 
Tutsi monarchy, and the education that many gnocidaires had received under the 
Kayibanda and Habyarimana regimes.49 
Rather than celebrating or dismissing these narratives in relation to their 
perceived historical accuracy (or lack thereof), a more valuable exercise lies in once 
again contextualizing these narratives in relation to the life histories of those who 
                                                
47 C. Newbury, The Cohesion of Oppression, 59; Des Forges, Defeat is the Only Bad News, 22##23. 
48 In actual fact, Paul Kagame is descended from the Abakagara lineage of the Ega clan, which still 
connotes elite status in Rwanda society as having produced many of RwandaÕs Queen Mothers, 
including the notorious Kanjogera. However perhaps, from the perspective of those gnocidaires 
who were attempting to establish continuity between Kagame and the oppression monarchs of 
RwandaÕs recent past, KagameÕs Ega heritage lacks the same immediacy compared to the better-
known Nyiginya clan, which was the royal clan. 
49 Much like the RPF, Kayibanda and Habyarimana engaged in historical revisionism during their 
rule. However, the official narratives under Kayibanda and Habyarimana were demonized the Tutsi 
as a means of distracting the Rwandan people from the corruption and mismanagement that 
characterized their tenure. Catharine Newbury, ÒEthnicity and the Politics of History in Rwanda,Ó 
in: David Lorey and William Beezley (eds.), Genocide, Collective Violence, and Popular Memory 
(Wilmington: Scholarly Resources Inc., 2002), 67##83. 
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voiced them and the broader political climate in which they were produced. The vast 
majority of the estimated 140,000 gnocidaires that have been imprisoned in post-
genocide Rwanda are men who, during the 1994 genocide, were adults between the 
ages of twenty to forty-nine years of age, who supported themselves through 
subsistence farming. An estimated seventy-seven percent were parents with slightly 
higher levels of education and literacy than found among the average population. 
These findings ## consistent among the twenty-seven gnocidaires who inform this 
article ## led Scott Straus to conclude that ÒRwandaÕs perpetrators (É) were quite 
ordinary. They were average adult Hutu men ## in terms of age, education, 
paternity, and occupation.Ó50 
Within this broader demographic profile, both Michel and Philippe had lived 
experiences that intimately affected how they constructed their narratives of the 
Tutsi monarchy. For his part, MichelÕs relatively peaceful and normal life had been 
suddenly upset by the RPF invasion of 1990, at which point Rwandan Patriotic 
Army (RPA) soldiers murdered his father, despite the fact that he was not part of the 
Hutu Power movement, nor had he ever publicly espoused anti-Tutsi sentiments. 
However, when attempting to justify his participation in the 1994 genocide, Michel 
cited not only his fatherÕs murder, but the more pressing danger of allowing Rwanda 
to fall once again into the hands of the Tutsi. His family had raised him on stories of 
the everyday oppression that the Hutu people had endured under the Tutsi 
monarchy. He was further inculcated with this theme as part of his education during 
the Kayibanda regime.51  
                                                
50 Scott Straus, The Order of Genocide: Race, Power, and War in Rwanda (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 2006), 107##108. 
51 Many Rwandans claim to have first learned about their ethnicity and that of their neighbors as 
part of their education during the Kayibanda and Habyarimana regimes, when Tutsi students were 
required to identify themselves as part of history lessons aimed at teaching the students about 
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Of particular importance, these abuses were not solely perpetrated by the 
Tutsi monarchy, but were intertwined with the fabric of everyday life in pre-colonial 
and colonial Rwanda. Michel cited the practice of ubuhake, wherein patronage 
networks were established through the gifting of cattle from a wealthy Tutsi to a 
(usually Hutu) subordinate who would in turn provide labor, a share of the returns, 
and political support to the patron as necessary. Michel interpreted this system as a 
form of slavery through which the Tutsi grew increasingly wealthy without having to 
burden themselves unnecessarily with manual labor. He argued that ubuhake allowed 
the Tutsi to justify the oppression of the Hutu masses. As simple farmers they were 
considered poorly mannered, stupid, and unattractive, and by the terms of ubuhake 
were afforded few opportunities to better themselves. Meanwhile the Tutsi were able 
to educate themselves, eat well, and avoid intense manual labor that might cause 
their bodies to degrade more rapidly. However, of these rumored practices, the 
kingÕs alleged habit of stabbing Hutu children with his spear to support himself as he 
stood had particularly resonated with Michel, convincing him that the Tutsi should 
never be permitted to regain political and military power in Rwanda.  
PhilippeÕs life history was similarly complicated by personal experience of 
atrocities at the hands of the RPA, family narratives of suffering under Tutsi 
hegemony, and the education he received under the Kayibanda regime. Philippe was 
adamant that he, and the Hutu people more generally, were the real victims in 
Rwanda, a position he supported by citing endless human rights abuses he and his 
ancestors had endured at the hands of their Tutsi compatriots. He argued that life in 
pre-colonial and colonial Rwanda was difficult even for those Hutu who had no 
direct dealings with the Tutsi monarch, because the intricate system of chiefs and 
sub-chiefs ## all of whom he claimed were also Tutsi ## that dominated Rwanda. 
                                                                                                                                                     
Hutu oppression at the hands of the Tutsi. C. Newbury, ÒEthnicity and the Politics of History in 
Rwanda.Ó  
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This hierarchy ensured that the Hutu remained uneducated and poor while allowing 
the Tutsi to claim the best of everything ## from crop yields to livestock to 
property ## in the name of the king. Those who resisted could be exiled or put to 
death for rejecting the kingÕs authority. As a result, Philippe claimed that the Hutu 
majority had been forced to work nearly to death to meet the unreasonable demands 
of their Tutsi leaders.  
As a history teacher who had been trained in the official histories that 
dominated under the Kayibanda and Habyarimana regimes, Philippe rarely 
distinguished between his familyÕs oppression and those abuses he learned in school 
as part of government curriculum. However, he noted that his grandparents (and 
every generation that preceded them since the arrival of the Tutsi in Rwanda) were 
victims of slavery, forced by the Tutsi to carry hot pots on their heads and work 
endlessly for just enough food to sustain them, while the Tutsi kept the most fertile 
land for their cattle. Quality of life for the Hutu improved slightly under Belgian 
rule. And under Kayibanda, life in Rwanda improved further: unlike previous 
generations from his family, Philippe completed primary and secondary school, 
trained as a teacher, and by his mid-twenties could afford to marry, raise children, 
and maintain a small piece of land.  
But the stories of oppression related to Philippe by his parents and 
grandparents offered lessons that were difficult for him to forget. When the RPA 
invaded Rwanda in 1990, Philippe was, for the first time in his life, overwhelmed 
with an intense fear of the Tutsi. He joined the local youth militia, the Interahamwe, 
with the intention of defending Rwanda from the Tutsi returnees who he believed 
were determined to reestablish a Tutsi monarchy and re-enslave the Hutu masses. 
Rumors of atrocities perpetrated by RPA troops against Hutu civilians in the north 
further convinced Philippe of the legitimacy of his beliefs. When Habyarimana was 
assassinated on 6 April 1994, extremists affiliated with his leadership claimed that 
the RPF was responsible for HabyarimanaÕs assassination, and Philippe found no 
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reason to doubt them. Realizing that the RPF was now close to gaining control of 
Rwanda, Philippe participated willingly in the massacre of Tutsi women, children, 
and elders who sought refuge in the local church, the hunting of Tutsi in the fields, 
forests, and swamps, the rape of Tutsi women, and the looting of Tutsi homes. The 
Tutsi were, in his estimation, the natural enemies of the Hutu people. However, 
Philippe simultaneously claimed that he rescued those Tutsi he knew were not a 
threat, providing food, information, and shelter for the duration of the genocide.  
Despite the varied roles Philippe adopted during the 1994 genocide, Philippe 
presented himself first and foremost as a victim of the fear and uncertainty 
associated with living through three years of civil war; of the greed and opportunism 
that emerged from gaining status and wealth from the Tutsi he helped murder; of 
the RPF ## the Òforeign TutsiÓ who, upon wrestling control of the nation, held him 
accountable for the atrocities he perpetrated with their victorÕs justice; and of the 
international community whose apathy made it possible for him to linger in a 
Rwandan prison with neither basic human rights nor access to adequate legal 
representation. But first and foremost, Philippe perceived himself to be a victim of 
history. Philippe understood his involvement in the 1994 genocide as the inevitable 
outcome of generations of internalized anger, fear, and resentment toward the Tutsi. 
This legacy of victimization made it possible for him, an educated, devout Christian 
man with no prior criminal record, to participate in the massacre of unarmed Tutsi 
civilians. Furthermore, it left him with little remorse for his criminal actions during 
the 1994 genocide, viewing his imprisonment as further evidence of the unjust 
persecution of the Hutu majority by the privileged Tutsi ## now championed by the 
RPF. 
 
Mythico-History 3: A Complicated Figure 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, some Rwandans demonstrated a more conflicted 
understanding of the Rwandan monarchy, as evidenced by the story of KamegeliÕs 
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Rock.52 A popular Rwandan story, this narrative was first shared by a Rwandan 
colleague, Grgoire, during a regular trip to Nyanza in southern Rwanda. As we 
drove, he spoke of a non-specific Tutsi king who responded to the would-be 
brutality of his advisors with equal viciousness to discourage unnecessary brutality 
within his kingdom. Grgoire initially presented the king as a responsible and 
benevolent leader who upon having a rare criminal brought before him was unsure 
of how to respond. He decided to delegate the task of deciding upon an appropriate 
punishment to his most trusted advisor, Kamegeli. Much to his surprise, Kamegeli 
suggested a particularly brutal form of public execution that involved chaining the 
criminal to a large rock and leaving him to die slowly of exposure. The king was so 
horrified that he pardoned the criminal, and in his place sentenced Kamegeli to the 
very punishment he had devised. He was promptly tied to the large rock where he 
soon died. 
While this narrative could be interpreted as a positive story intended to 
highlight the kingÕs benevolent nature as evidenced by his response to the shocking 
brutality of his advisors, the storyÕs ending demonstrates that the king was not above 
resorting to the same brutal punishment he claimed to eschew if he deemed it 
necessary. Given the complex light in which this unidentified monarch was 
portrayed, GrgoireÕs life history becomes crucial for revealing the political climate 
and personal experiences influencing his particular telling of this story. 
Grgoire is an old case-load refugee who returned to Rwanda after the 1994 
genocide. His family, descended from the royal Nyiginya clan, was forced to flee 
Rwanda during the ethnic and political violence that surrounded the 1959 Hutu 
                                                
52 The word kamegeri means Òlittle mushroomÓ and references imegeri ## a type of mushroom that 
is grilled in a hot earthenware pan. Rose-Marie Mukarutabana argues this connection suggests that 
the story was invented by Rwandans as a parable of sorts, evoking the Rwandan equivalent of an 
Òeye for an eye.Ó Personal communication, 2014.  
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Revolution. His father was close to Ndahindurwa, who fled Rwanda in 1959 and 
who continues to live in exile. With his escape, GrgoireÕs family lost its patron and 
was forced to flee as well, first to Burundi, and later to the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo (DRC). Upon learning that the RPF was preparing to invade Rwanda in 
1990, however, Grgoire joined the RPA, with whom he would fight for four years. 
Once the RPF had wrestled control of the nation, formally ending the 1994 
genocide, Grgoire brought his wife and children to Rwanda. Soon after, he lost 
favor with his commanding officer for stealing, allegedly to supply the rapidly 
growing numbers of Rwandan recruits under his command. Grgoire served a 
minimal sentence, but while he considered the matter closed, he remained vigilant of 
the possibility that his past arrest could cause him to be labeled a political subversive 
at any time. As such, he was cautious about discussing RPF actions or policies in 
public settings, even among trusted colleagues and friends, lest his comments be 
interpreted as evidence of political dissidence. 
GrgoireÕs narrative of the kingÕs use of capital punishment was thus 
necessarily complicated. RwandaÕs current political climate dictates that Rwandans be 
wary of appearing supportive of the monarchy, lest it be interpreted as evidence of 
their dissatisfaction with the RPF. Yet simultaneously, Rwandans must avoid 
appearing critical of the monarchy, lest it be interpreted as evidence that they have 
internalized the genocide ideology popularized under Hutu Presidents Grgoire 
Kayibanda and Juvnal Habyarimana, which condemned the monarchy as an 
instrument of Hutu oppression. Thus, GrgoireÕs particular narrative of KamegeliÕs 
Rock can be interpreted as a politically appropriate way to engage with and preserve 
memories of the Rwandan monarchy ## highlighting positive and negative 
attributes of this institution without revealing the narrator to be particularly invested 
in either position.  
Alexis KagameÕs version of the story of KamegeliÕs Rock, published in 1972, 
reveals similar themes: 
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Wishing to practice exemplary justice by matching the punishment to the crime, 
the King once had the opportunity to issue two sentences that remain famous 
in our traditions. He asked his chiefs to suggest punishments for a range of 
crimes, but without specifically naming those crimes. Without revealing his 
intentions, he took particular note of the proposals put forward by chiefs 
Mikoranya and Kamegeli. Sometime later, the chiefs successively committed 
crimes, of nature of which is has since been forgotten. The King took the 
opportunity to inflict upon them the terrible punishments they devised. 
Kamegeli was grilled on a white hot rock. Ever since, this rock is called 
KamegeliÕs Rock, located in Ruhango, close to Mutakara. As for Chief 
Mikoranya, a tall piece of markamia wood was made into a lever and placed 
outside a hut. MikoranyaÕs arms were tied behind his back using a cow tendon 
[or sinew] so that his elbows touched; a strong rope was attached to his arms, 
and then pulled through the roof of the hut and attached to the wood lever 
outside to create tension. Once the lever released, the unfortunate man was 
violently lifted in the air and suspended under the roof of the hut, where he 
died.53 
Kagame provides additional context in recounting this story, whose protagonist is 
identified as King Mibambwe Mutabazi Gisanura, also known as Gisanura the Just.54 
Gisanura is a popular figure in Rwandan history due to his legacy of providing pre-
colonial Rwandans with fair laws and judgment. His court at Mutakara gave rise to 
the Rwandan proverb Òrwaciriwe i MutakaraÓ (Òthe case was tried in MutakaraÓ), 
                                                
53 Alexis Kagame, Un Abrg de lÕEthno-Histoire du Rwanda (Butare, Rwanda: Editions universitaires 
du Rwanda, 1972), 123. Translation by authors and Rose-Marie Mukarutabana. 
54 Vansina, Antecedents, 99. 
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which implies a situation has been considered with exceptional fairness and 
thoroughness, and the subsequent decision is beyond appeal. According to Kagame, 
Gisanura was particularly appreciated by his people for a range of humanitarian acts, 
such as taxing the rich to provide free meals to the poor, and travelers and visitors to 
the court whose stays were extended in order to allow him to fully consider the cases 
being brought before him.55 
As in the case of Grgoire, KagameÕs account of KamegeliÕs Rock was 
narrated during a tense period in RwandaÕs history. The notoriously anti-Tutsi 
regime of President Kayibanda was coming to a close amid allegations of corruption 
and regional favoritism, despite the regimeÕs efforts to distract the public with the 
national security threat allegedly posed by the inyenzi invasions.56 As a Tutsi elite who 
actively championed the interests of the monarchy, KagameÕs interest in preserving 
knowledge of the Rwandan monarchy was undoubtedly personally and politically 
motivated, as well as a matter of professional and intellectual interest.57 However, 
surrounding the 1959 Hutu Revolution, Kagame was also a vocal supporter of 
Rwandan independence who, in its aftermath, was permitted to hold a prominent 
position at the National University of Rwanda, despite the presence of a quota 
system that limited the number of Tutsi within the Rwandan government, military 
and education institutions. Under the circumstances, KagameÕs complex narrative of 
the KamegeliÕs Rock and the kingÕs simultaneous impulses to eschew and enable two 
brutal forms of capital punishment, could be interpreted as the result of KagameÕs 
tenuous position of privilege within the Kayibanda regime. 
                                                
55 Kagame, Abrg, 123. 
56 The term inyenzi references Tutsi refugees who, after fleeing previous periods of ethnic and 
political tension in Rwanda, settled in neighboring countries where they gained political and 
military support and periodically tried to return to Rwanda by force.  
57 Claudine Vidal, ÒAlexis Kagame entre mmoire et histoire,Ó History in Africa 15 (1988), 
493##504. 
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Conclusion: Political Cleavages in the Everyday  
While valuable in their own right, the above mythico-histories are of great 
importance for their ability to reveal ongoing political, ethnic, and social tensions 
that are, in many ways, specific to post-genocide Rwanda. For example, the general 
reticence surrounding how ordinary Rwandans speak about the monarchy in public 
settings exposes the fear that characterizes everyday life in post-genocide Rwanda, 
particularly for those individuals who harbor political beliefs and lived experiences 
that do not mesh with the RPFÕs official narrative.58 While many Rwandans 
nonetheless do choose to tell their stories of RwandaÕs past, they find subtle ways to 
navigate the inherent risks in storytelling. In the case of the story of KamegeliÕs 
Rock, this was accomplished by balancing the positive and negative attributes of the 
Rwandan monarchy to create the impression that the speaker was neutral. 
Still others used mythico-histories of the monarchy to resist RwandaÕs current 
official narrative and assert their individual lived experiences. Among gnocidaires, it 
was no longer necessary to find a politically appropriate way to speak about the 
monarchy as they were already being punished for their crimes. Thus, they spoke 
freely and perhaps even exaggerated their stories of the Rwandan monarchy to better 
highlight the dangers of Tutsi rule for Rwanda, and recast their criminal complicity 
in the 1994 genocide as justified. Among Rwandans who were intimately connected 
to the monarchy, however, the mythico-history seemed to have been constructed to 
have the opposite effect: infusing the listener with sense that the monarchy was a 
positive force in the lives of Rwandans, while diminishing those aspects of 
monarchical leadership that could have been harmful to emphasize the unexpected 
and disproportionate nature of the 1994 genocide. 
                                                
58 Cf. Thomson, Whispering Truth to Power; cf. Burnet, Genocide Lives in Us. 
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However, these narratives are of additional value for their ability to highlight 
the challenges facing oral historians in post-genocide Rwanda. Because history in 
post-genocide Rwanda is highly politicized ## much more so than in previous 
periods in the nationÕs past ## and has such dangerous potential for ordinary 
Rwandans, oral historians must be cognizant of the possibility that much of the data 
they collect, and their subsequent interpretations, will be highly politicized as well. 
The use of multiple life history and thematic interviews and long-term observation 
can reduce the risks of this kind of contamination by allowing oral historians to 
better contextualize narratives in relation to the dynamic personal, social and 
political contexts in which they are produced. However, the impact of this climate in 
Rwanda can never be eliminated completely, nor can its ability to polarize 
researchers. 
To this end, it is essential that current scholars be well-read in RwandaÕs 
contested past, including the pre-colonial period, and particularly as written and 
debated in the pre-genocide period. The above narratives on the Rwandan monarchy 
clearly demonstrate that despite the dissemination of the RPFÕs official narrative in 
the post-genocide period, Rwandans remain invested ## at least in private ## in 
divergent versions of Rwandan history that align more closely with their lived 
experiences, inherited knowledge of the past, and political affiliations. As such, it 
becomes particularly important for historians to consider the full depth and 
complexity of Rwandan history as discussed in the pre-genocide period in order to 
better contextualize the data that will be made available to them in the coming years. 
In this recommendation, we are guided by David NewburyÕs recent warning, that in 
the aftermath of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, we must critically examine historical 
narratives, lest they become simplified propaganda.59  
                                                
59
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